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Abstract 
Using the HICP (Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices) the author tests the series for the makeup of its dynamic 
components both before and after the start of stage three of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policy direc-
tive. While it appears ECB is meeting its stated objective, it is perhaps more important to address the composition of 
the lag and volatility of monetary policy to see how a policy change alters the fundamental dynamic structure of an 
economic system. The HICP data provides a good natural experiment for assessing structural change. This is important 
because while a policy may achieve its goal(s), in doing so it may alter the fundamental nature of how that system 
behaves, potentially causing the system to be more volatile or more sensitive to exogenous shocks in the future. 
Changes to the fundamental nature of a dynamic system can mean that future policies, that are similar to the present 
policies, could have very different impacts on that very same system in terms of both long run and short run effects. 
The paper finds that while the ECB may be meeting its stated objectives, it may be potentially increasing the degree 
and severity of future short run deflationary/inflationary cycles from similar policies in the future due to the type of 
random and deterministic components in the system. More data and further study is needed to determine the long-term 
affects of monetary policy in economic systems as many economic cycles are indeed very long. 
Keywords: dynamic systems, Hurst exponent, chaos, long-term memory, monetary policy. 
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Introduction© 
The historical consensus is that monetary policy 
actions “affect economic conditions only after a lag 
that is both long and variable” (Friedman, 1961). 
Yet, we still have not been able to describe well 
what this entails. There has been a growing body of 
literature in economics about the complexity and 
memory of economic systems and the importance of 
considering the dynamic nature of the system in 
question. From the standpoint of deterministic sys-
tems and chaos the works of Arthur (2013), Baumol 
and Behhabib (1989) and Tamari (2012) are just a 
few of examples. The literature is also replete with 
the measurement of persistence and long-term 
memory (random or not) in dynamic process such 
as Fama and French (1988), Hsieh (1991) and Lo 
(1991). Coupling the historical precedent with the 
growing research in dynamic systems we have room 
for intriguing questions about whether or not a sys-
tem is chaotic or random and what type of random-
ness may be involved as well as the length of cycles 
involved. 
Due to what appears to be the increasing speed at 
which the dynamic nature of economic systems 
changes, it is becoming more and more important that 
we seek to describe and understand the various phe-
nomena that occur within these systems. For instance, 
I have found that gold prices contain both random and 
deterministic components that can be separated and 
measured (Sanderson, 2011). Still others have shown 
that economic systems emerge spontaneously on their 
own from a decentralized state (Howitt and Clower, 
2000). Along these lines, we have a good natural 
                                                     
© Rohnn Sanderson, 2013.  
experiment for testing how the structure of the Euro 
has been altered due to a policy change with the 
implementation of the third stage of the of the 
ECB’s monetary policy. 
As is the case for most central banks or monetary 
union, a common concern is that of inflation. In the 
case of the European Central Bank, the stated objec-
tive is “To maintain price stability is the primary 
objective of the Eurosystem and of the single mone-
tary policy for which it is responsible. This is laid 
down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union, Article 127 (1)” (ECB: Objective of 
monetary policy, 2013): 
♦ “Without prejudice to the objective of price stabil-
ity”, the Eurosystem shall also “support the gener-
al economic policies in the Union with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives 
of the Union”. These include inter alia “full em-
ployment” and “balanced economic growth”.  
♦ “The Treaty establishes a clear hierarchy of objec-
tives for the Eurosystem. It assigns overriding im-
portance to price stability. The Treaty makes clear 
that ensuring price stability is the most important 
contribution that monetary policy can make to 
achieve a favorable economic environment and a 
high level of employment”. 
Further, the goal of the ECB aims at inflation rates 
(HICP) of at or below 2 percent. Putting aside discus-
sions of if this is an appropriate macroeconomic objec-
tive, I believe we should still ask how a policy impacts 
an economic system aside from meeting the stated 
objective. Further the ECB seeks to “reduce distor-
tions of inflation and deflation” (ECB: Objective of 
monetary policy, 2013). 
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Given this backdrop, this paper will investigate 
what the total effect to the system has been, consi-
dering the change in policy with the implementation 
of stage three of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). The start of stage three by the ECB meant 
that they began their implementation of a Harmo-
nized Index of Consumer Prices for use in policy 
decisions. According to the ECB “The HICP aims to 
be representative of the developments in the prices of 
all goods and services available for purchase within 
the Euro area for the purposes of directly satisfying 
consumer needs (HICP Definition, 2013). It meas-
ures the average change over time in the prices paid 
by households for a specific, regularly updated 
basket of consumer goods and services”. 
Fundamental changes to how the system behaves 
could have potential large, sector wide, impacts 
which could include but are not limited to: increased 
volatility of the business cycle, increased uncertainty 
in general economic conditions, as well as a potential 
to increase the number of “black swans” (Taleb, 
2007) that may appear. In the case of the implemen-
tation of the HICP index there has been a fundamen-
tal change in the dynamics of the system. More re-
search and time will be needed to discover whether 
or not we find the change acceptable, but as you will 
see in the analysis, the system itself has been altered. 
While the ECB is most assuredly considering busi-
ness cycles, market expectations, inflation and the 
like it is critical that we seek to fully understand the 
dynamics involved for a clearer picture of policy 
affect. 
1. Analysis 
To begin, let us look at how the HICP has changed. 
Below is a graph of the the HICP index overtime. As 
you can see it appears that there is a structural change 
that occurs after the start of stage three of the EMU 
policy. 
 
Fig. 1. HICP overall index, annual rate of change (1991-2013) 
 
Table 1. The descriptive statistics of the HICP 
 Prior to stage three After stage three 
Mean 2.62 2.06 
Standard deviation 0.98 0.76 
Maximum 5 4 
Minimum 0.8 -0.6 
Range 4.2 4.6 
 
An F-test yields a result of 1.66 allowing us to 
conclude that the mean before and after the policy 
are statistically significantly different from one 
another. Normally this is where the authors might stop 
and say the policy has met its objective. Let us now 
dig deeper into how the system has been altered due to 
the policy beyond the first and second moments of 
a distribution. Though the ACF is not a perfect 
measure, let us start with an ACF function. Using 
an ACF, both random phenomena and chaotic 
phenomena can look identical in their ACF (San-
derson, 2011). 
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Fig. 2. ACF of HICP before ECB policy implementation 
 
The era before the policy implementation shows 
relatively pretty classic auto-regressive behavior 
while we can see that the post policy era is showing 
some oscillating behavior. We now need to deter-
mine what kind of phenomena is occurring. To drill 
a little deeper, let us first look at a spectral analysis 
both before and after the policy change to get an 
idea of any long-term cycles that may exist. 
 
Fig. 3. Full spectrum periodogram pre ECB policy 
 
The data before the policy implementation is not 
showing any cycles, or if any do exist, their wave-
length is longer than the 96 months of data, which 
is a possibility. In either case the authors find no 
cycling behavior prior to the move to the Harmo-
nized Index of Consumer Prices. 
 
Fig. 4. Full spectrum periodogram after ECB policy implementation 
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The post policy data spectral analysis confers two 
significant cycles; one at 43.25 months and one at 
28.83 months. Now that the authors have con-
firmed a cycle, we need to see whether or not 
randomness contributes to increasing or decreas-
ing the oscillations. Recall that not all random-
ness is regular Brownian motion (RBM). Most is 
not regular Brownian motion, but is the special 
type of fractal Brownian motion (FBM) where the 
fractal dimension is 0.5 (Sanderson, 2009). If the 
data is deterministic we could perhaps see it on 
an attractor plot (Sanderson, 2012). In the case 
here, we are not seeing deterministic behavior, 
but randomness in both cases. 
 
Fig. 5. Prepolicy attractor 
 
Fig. 5. Postpolicy attractor 
 
We will confirm this by measuring the Hurst expo-
nent (Hurst, 1951; Sanderson, 2011), the Maximum 
Lyapunov Exponent (LE) (Wolf, 1985) and the fractal 
dimension via the box counting method (Elhert, 
2007). All measures help to describe the behavior of 
the system and their values are noted in the table 
below. 
Table 2. Dynamic systems measures 
 Before policy After policy 
Hurst exponent 0.99995 0.83131 
Maximum LE -0.0234 -0.0985 
Fractal dimension 1.9056 1.9033 
The Hurst exponent lets us know the amount of 
persistence in a system, a Hurst value of 0.5 indi-
cates no persistence (RBM), greater than 0.5 means 
persistence (events are positively correlated). The 
Policy had the effect of lowering the level of persis-
tence. This however could still mean the system is 
either random (FBM) or deterministic (chaotic). A 
good measure to help with the story is the LE. An 
LE of zero would mean the system is conservative. 
A positive value would indicate chaos and a negative 
value would mean the system is dissipative. In this 
case, both systems are dissipative since the LE’s are 
negative. Dissipative systems exhibit asymptotic 
stability; they are displaying randomness. With the 
LE of the after policy implementation data getting 
larger, this implies the system has become more dis-
sipative, which implies the system is more stable 
(still FBM) and possibly developing an attracting 
orbit. Thus conferring the cycles we saw in the spec-
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tral analysis are FBM. In other words, the policy 
change has caused the system to start orbiting 
around a point, but it is doing so in a random FBM 
manner. That is to say while the policy has stabi-
lized the series to orbit around a point, it has also 
had the effect of creating persistent oscillations 
around that point. So the policy has had the effect of 
creating cycles of inflationary pressures and then 
deflationary ones that randomly orbit around the 2 
percent target. Since the scope of the paper is not to 
 
discuss whether or not the policy is “good”, I wil-
lleave it to the reader to decide if that is a preferred 
regime compared to the previous one of the fairly 
common AR (1) variety. 
To check if there is any deterministic phenomena in 
the series that has gone undetected due to the size of 
the randomness, a space-time regression will be per-
formed to separate the series into its random and de-
terministic components (Sanderson, 2011). The results 
are shown in the graphs below.  
 
Fig. 6. Components of Index before-policy implementation 
 
While the deterministic components both before and 
after the policy are small, one can still see the beha-
vior. In the case before the policy, we see the effect 
of a damped oscillator that diminishes to a stationary 
point. Comparing the scale of the random to determi-
nistic parts of the series yields the result that ran-
domness is, on average, a factor of 2332 times bigger 
than the deterministic component before the policy. 
 
Fig. 7. Components of Index after-policy implementation 
 
After the policy is implemented we can see that the 
deterministic behavior is the cyclic behavior that we 
saw in our spectral analysis previously with the two 
cycles of 43.25 and 28.83 months respectively. The 
deterministic component of the series has now be-
come an oscillation that does not diminish. What this 
means, is that we are now starting to see a pattern of 
multiple equilibria start to emerge as one might see 
in a chaotic system where there is not one single 
equilibrium but a multitude of virtually infinite equi-
libria. A dynamic system that is continually oscillat-
ing is always in equilibrium, just like a planet in or-
bit. What usually happens that is of concern, is that 
an oscillating system can become more sensitive to 
additional changes. Take a calm pond for example, 
once you throw in the first stone you cause some 
ripples and motion. As you keep throwing in stones, 
you can either increase or decrease the magnitude of 
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the waves depending on whether or not the new 
stone hits the water in harmony with the cycle or not. 
As a matter of comparison the randomness in the 
series before and after the policy is now only on av-
erage a factor of 170 times more than the determinis-
tic component. That is a decrease in the magnitude of 
randomness in the signal by 13.72 times, which is a 
very surprising shift indeed. A look at the attractor 
plot of the deterministic component after the policy 
reveals some of this multi-equilibrium behavior. 
 
Fig. 8. Attractor plot of post policy deterministic signal 
 
What we see in the attractor plot is that the determi-
nistic component of the series appears to be a strange 
attractor. If the deterministic component gets larger the 
system could develop momentum of its own that may 
be difficult to alter. This could be either “good” or 
“bad” from a policy perspective. Thinking about the 
composition of both the deterministic and random 
components a system allows us to begin a new con-
versation about monetary policy in an ever changing 
system. 
Conclusion 
It is important that we start to further investigate, not 
only whether or not a policy meets its stated objective, 
but also how a policy can cause structural changes to 
the dynamic nature of an economic system. The ECB 
data provided a natural test for seeing the changes in 
the dynamic structure of a system. In the case of the 
implementation of Stage Three of the EMU policy, we 
have seen that a cursory look at the data seems to sug-
gest, that while the ECB is meeting their objective of 
price stability, they may additionally be altering the 
structure of the economy in ways that may cause the 
system to be more or less sensitive to change in the 
future; depending on the relative size of each compo-
nent. The policy has caused the signal to change from 
an AR(1) type of persistence, to two more pronounced 
phenomena: a large oscillatory random FBM and an 
oscillatory deterministic behavior. While this may not 
be surprising, as it is generally accepted that monetary 
policy changes cause long lags that can be highly vari- 
 
able, the type of randomness and volatility can funda-
mentally alter how the system behaves in the future. 
This can have a twofold effect on future policy. First, 
it will be difficult for most economic agents to deter-
mine whether the oscillation is random or part of a 
deterministic cycle. The deterministic component can 
become very sensitive to small changes (may become 
chaotic). This can cause many unforeseen problems, 
from a policy perspective changes to the money 
supply or other variables could either increase the 
amplitude of the wave, if they are in time with both or 
one of components, or unintentionally we could see 
that either the random or deterministic component 
could “cancel out” the effect of a monetary policy. 
Monetary policy changes could also have the effect of 
enlarging the deterministic component more increas-
ing the likelihood that the system may become more 
chaotic. As the deterministic components of a system 
become larger they will make a system more sensitive 
to changes if they become chaotic. As more data be-
comes available it would be prudent to continue to 
investigate structural changes to this dynamic system 
as well as others. While it appears that the general 
consensus on monetary policy is correct in that there 
are large random lags, FBM is much different from 
RBM. Increasing levels of persistence in a system 
whether they be random or deterministic can have 
drastically different short run and potential long run 
effects. We are only just beginning to appreciate the 
dynamic complexity of economic systems and the 
issues that policy decisions create in these systems 
warrants consideration in policy decision making. 
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